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*****
AFTERNOON PROCEEDINGS
MS. TABER: Good afternoon. We’re ready to start our afternoon
segment of today’s symposium. On behalf of the American University
Law Review, I would like to welcome you to the keynote address for
the Beyond Napster Symposium. I’d like to introduce Professor Walter
Effross. Professor Effross is a professor of commercial law and
e-commerce law, and Director of the Program on Counseling
Electronic Commerce Entrepreneurs here at the Washington College
of Law. Professor Effross will be introducing our distinguished
speaker this afternoon, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the Southern
District New York. Please join me in welcoming Professor Effross.
PROFESSOR EFFROSS: Let me begin by recalling that when I was
maybe twelve years old, I was a big fan of Isaac Asimov’s
popularization of science.
He had a number of not just
science-fiction works but, also, nonfiction essays, being a trained
chemist himself, on all areas of science.
One of the things that strangely enchanted me, and that I never
forgot was that, in one of his essays, he remarked that if you show to a
chemist the word unionized, most chemists will automatically, and by
reflex, read that same word as “un-ionized.” That stayed with me all
these years.
I thought I found a strange parallel to some of the topics under
discussion today. It occurred to me that in Shakespeare’s Richard
III, there is a scene where Richard III, at that point only the Duke of
1
Gloucester, says famously, “Now is the winter of our discontent.” I
thought, if you change the emphasis on that just a little bit, in terms
of the syllables, you get, now is the winter of our “dis-content,” which
I think is something that a number of industries are really starting to
feel, not just because of the weather, but because of all of the actions
of all of the people out there who are helping themselves to a
number of items which are copyrighted, and a number of people who
are devising systems to allow that type of transaction, or transition to
occur.
Another interesting thing about that quote, once I started looking
at it was, no less a person than Justice Stevens, speaking in 1991 to
practitioners in Pennsylvania, said, “The listener, who at first assumes

1. William Shakespeare, THE TRAGEDY OF RICHARD THE THIRD, Act I, sc. 1.
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that the word ‘now’ refers an unhappy winter, soon learns that
war-torn England has been ‘made glorious by this son of York.’ It is
now summer,” not winter and, essentially, words, even a simple word
2
like now, may have a meaning that is not immediately apparent.
So, I thought that was also strangely relevant because in this
situation there is a question of who, ultimately, is going to benefit
from Napster-type materials, processes and programs? Perhaps, in
some way, some of the content providers may, in fact, end up doing
better, as with the VCR, than they did before. So, there’s this
tension—is it summer—or is it winter—for the content providers and
for the people using their services?
All around, it seems to be summer for the lawyers, but it’s my
honor and privilege to introduce the symposium’s keynote speaker,
Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District of New York. His full
biography is in your materials and rather than summarize that for
you, I’d like to mention that most relevant to us today is his decision
3
in Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes.
I should mention that the case and the decision appear to have
made Judge Kaplan, himself, a cyber-celebrity of sorts. I went to
Google this morning and found 1,220 pages listed for Reimerdes and,
although they’re probably not all directly related to this case, 6,144
for Judge Lewis Kaplan.
Whether or not you agree with all of the judge’s conclusions, and
I’m not here to be partisan in any way on that, I think the opinion is
very instructive. Just as Isaac Asimov did with science, I think it
essentially provides a tutorial on not only the technological aspects of
the Internet, computers, hyperlinks, encryption and decryption but
also provides a nice discussion on of the provisions and the policy
and a parsing of the Copyright Act, particularly, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, and the First Amendment.
Although I have no specific knowledge of this, I suspect that one of
the reasons it is so plainly and clearly written is because the judge was
aware that a lot of people who were not lawyers would have an
intense interest in this case and would like to learn about these ideas
and about what the Court was saying and why. Therefore, it is written
in judicial plain English.
I’m going to use the decision in my e-commerce course next
semester for a number of reasons. One of which, strikingly, is the
arsenal of analogies that the judge has used. One of them, which is

2. John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1373 (1992).
3. 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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very close to the beginning of the case says, “In an era in which the
transmission of computer viruses—which like [the decryption
program in question], are simply computer code and thus to some
degree expressive—can disable systems upon which the nation
depends and in which other computer code also is capable of
inflicting other harm, society must be able to regulate the use and
dissemination of code in appropriate circumstances.
The
Constitution, after all, is a framework for building a just and
4
democratic society. It is not a suicide pact.”
At another point, later in the opinion, the judge said that making
this code which would allow the decryption of DVD discs as a number
of Web sites and people were doing, “is analogous to the publication
of a bank vault combination in a national newspaper. Even if no one
uses the combination to open the vault, its mere publication has the
effect of defeating the bank’s security system, forcing the bank to
5
reprogram the lock.” Then the judge stated, “Development and
implementation of a new DVD copy protection system, however, is far
more difficult and costly than reprogramming a combination lock
and may carry with it the added problem of rendering the existing
6
installed base of compliant DVD players obsolete.”
The judge noted in discussing the First Amendment issue that a
particular provision of the DMCA, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, “had nothing to do with suppressing particular ideas of
computer programmers and everything to do with functionality—
with preventing people from circumventing technological
access-control measures—just as laws prohibiting the possession of
burglar tools have nothing to do with preventing people from
expressing themselves by accumulating what to them may be
attractive assortments of implements and everything to do with
7
preventing burglaries.”
The final instance, which I won’t read to you in full, is an extended
analogy and comparison between methods of epidemiological
spreading. Judge Kaplan compared shutting down a printing press to
shutting down a poisoned well. If you shut down a poisoned well and
don’t let anybody drink the water, then you pretty much stop a noncontagious infection from spreading.
However, he compared
Napster to a disease outbreak, in which some of the sites
disseminating this code which would allow you to decrypt DVDs,

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 304.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 329.
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make it possible for that information to be passed on and on and on
through the Internet and are, in effect, the equivalent of individuals
infecting each other. There is not a single source. The judge
concluded: the people who are “infected with the disease of capability
of circumventing measures controlling access to copyrighted works in
digital form” [in other words, the people who had downloaded this
software] “do not suffer from having that ability. They cannot be
relied upon to identify themselves to those seeking to control the
“disease.” Their self-interest will motivate some to misuse capability, a
8
misuse that, in practical terms, often will be untraceable.”
To the new law you heard this morning that Declan McCullagh
added to Moore’s Law, I would provide a law which I would humbly
call Effross’s Law. I think that just as we see new technology building
on old technology, we’re going to see a lot of new analogies building
on old analogies. Whether you agree or not with any of the
particular analogies Judge Kaplan has used or the conclusions which
he has reached, I think that a good analogy, and this is my rule, like
one of Judge Kaplan’s epidemics, would spread and infect and spawn
new varieties of itself. If you want to put it a little more colloquially,
Jimmy Buffet, that legal sage, famously said, “Changes in Latitudes,
Changes in Attitudes.” I would say, changes in attitudes, changes in
platitudes and the reverse, changes in platitudes will cause (not to say
the judge was engaging in platitudes, just for purposes of rhyming)
changes in attitudes.
Finally, I would like to add, I believe I was one of the first
academics, in an article I wrote on stored-value cards several years ago
and how they can be hacked and other related legal issues, to cite the
2600 magazine that put up the Web site that is the core of a lot of the
9
issues here. I would recommend that magazine to people, not
necessarily because I agree with or endorse any of its viewpoints, but
because I think it provides an interesting perspective on the
community of people who want to see themselves as hackers;
wannabe hackers, as well as people who really are hackers. At a
minimum, it is an interesting cultural artifact. For obvious reasons,
I’m not on their mailing list, but I would mention, you can buy it—
it’s a small digest-sized publication issued quarterly at just about any
Barnes and Noble or Borders and I think it provides $5-worth of at
least entertainment, if not some form of perspective.

8. Id. at 332.
9. Walter A. Effross, Putting the Cards Before the Purse?: Distinctions Differences and
Dilemmas in the Regulation of Stored Value Card Systems, 65 UMKC L. REV. 319, 328
(discussing publication of article on “memory card” weaknesses).
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So, I think it’s still up in the air how harsh this winter will be and
for whom. But to shed more light on the subject (to switch analogies
in midstream) I’d like to introduce Judge Kaplan.
JUDGE KAPLAN: When I went to law school, copyright perhaps
was one of the less glamorous and less popular areas of the law. But
as this symposium demonstrates, copyright in this presidential
election year is a matter of intense interest, as the Napster, DVD and
MP3.com cases have focused a bright spotlight on the intersection
between the Copyright Act and some exceptionally popular uses of
the Internet. The bitterness and sloganeering that characterized the
presidential campaign, hard as it would have been to imagine even a
few years ago, have been matched by the bitterness and sloganeering
that now characterize the debate over the proper accommodation
among copyright, the Internet, and other technological
developments of the electronic era. The dispute has focused on two
issues. The first is the extent to which persons may distribute
copyrighted material over the Internet without the consent of the
copyright holder. The second is whether and to what extent people
should be free to circumvent technological means of controlling
access to copyrighted words available in digital form.
Napster, DVD and MP3.com all involve attempts to resolve these
issues in the courts. I propose to share some thoughts with you today
about the process by which these issues should be resolved. But,
perhaps at the outset it is worth stepping back for a moment and to
put the current controversies into a bit of historical context.
We live in the opening years of the fourth great age of human
communication, each a product of technological progress. The first
was the development of written language, which permitted the
precise transmission of human thought over distance and time and
made obsolete the far less accurate oral tradition. Centuries later,
written language was followed by the printing press, which enabled
the mass production and dissemination of writing and, incidentally,
made the written word a means of economic gain. After several
hundred more years came the development of broadcasting, which
instantaneously transmits the spoken word and, more recently, visual
images over vast geographic distances and reaches enormous
numbers of people. Now we have the Internet, which for the first
time has placed a means of mass communication in the hands of
anyone with a computer and a telephone line.
Each of these developments exponentially broadened the reach of
the human word.
Each offered enormous potential for the
betterment of the human condition. Yet each- particularly each step
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in the development of mass communication-carried also the potential
for abuse or, at any rate, the potential for perceived abuse. In
consequence, each development brought with it a period of
accommodation among competing interests.
The printing press was introduced into England in the fifteenth
century, just in time to become a thorn in the side of Henry VIII
when his efforts to dissolve his marriage to Catherine of Aragon led
to the Act of Supremacy, which made the king head of the Church of
England and displaced papal supremacy in ecclesiastical matters. I
rather imagine that this event was at least as controversial in the
England of 1534 as the presidential election is today, and Henry was
especially sensitive to criticism. He imposed a system of general
censorship to control the dissemination of negative views about his
actions. But as Professor (later Justice) Benjamin Kaplan wrote,
“such a system has always been found a slippery and inefficient
10
business.” So the Tudor monarchs conferred the exclusive right of
printing on the Stationers’ Company and enlisted it in enforcing
royal censorship policy, a role that it played until the emancipation of
the English press more than a century later.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the origins of copyright
lie in the mechanism by which rights to print particular works were
11
allocated among the members of the Stationers’ Company. The
particular member of the Company who was granted the right to
print any given work was said to hold the copyright.
Of course, the basis for copyright long since has changed and, in
any case, this is a digression. The point of my reference to Tudor
England is that the technological revolution wrought by the printing
press was perceived by the crown as a threat. It adopted a repressive
method of dealing with it. Its action was followed by a long period of
gradual accommodation between the interests of the English state, on
the one hand, and those advocating free expression on the other.
The next great leap brought its own problems. As radio came into
vogue, there was a vast increase in the number of broadcasting
stations. Stations adopted whatever frequencies they wished and
12
competed to drown out each others’ signals. Chaos reigned. So
Congress ultimately stepped in with the Radio Act of 1927 and, later,
the Communications Act of 1934 and with the concept of public
allocation of electromagnetic frequencies. The solution arguably was
far from perfect. FCC regulation meant a certain amount of

10. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3 (1967).
11. Id. at 4.
12. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969).
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censorship or content regulation, witness the Pacifica case of 1978
14
Indeed, the system has changed in
and the fairness doctrine.
important respects. Once again, however, there has been a lengthy
process of experimentation and adjustment as society has come to
grips with a new communications technology.
There have been two constants, I suggest, in this centuries-old tale.
The first is the constant cry of repression, sometimes well founded
and sometimes less so, born of attempts by government to deal with
special problems created by new communications technology. The
second is that free expression, broadly speaking, ultimately has
triumphed, but never without some accommodation to genuine
problems created by each new means of communication.
So that brings us to the Internet and the current controversies,
which at root involve the issue of the extent to which copyright will
restrict dissemination of materials on the Internet and other digital
media. One does not need to look far to find the extremists on
either side. In one corner, we have those who view any means of
protecting the economic interests of copyright holders, no matter
how blunt the method and no matter how restrictive of other
interests, as trumping all other considerations. In the other corner
are those who assert that the First Amendment prohibits any
regulation of both computer code and the Internet, some few of
whom in any case espouse the view that circumvention even of legal
restrictions is justified in the interests of what might be called cyberfreedom or, perhaps, cyber-anarchy. While these widely disparate
beliefs are sincerely held, one may doubt the consistency of their
views with the essentially centrist nature of our political system and
the Constitution.
Let us begin with the Constitution, which was very much the focus
15
of the recent DVD case.
The defendants there were using the
Internet to disseminate software, the sole purpose of which was to
decipher the encryption that protects copyrighted DVD movies from
unlawful copying. They maintained that software, or code, is
expression and, in consequence, that the Digital Millennium
16
Copyright Act, which prohibits dissemination of such circumvention
technology, violates the First Amendment. The argument was simple.
Code is speech; speech may not be restricted.

13. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (FCC sanction for using
indecent but not obscene language in broadcast did not violate First Amendment).
14. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. 367.
15. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.
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I was persuaded that computer code is expressive and a matter of
First Amendment concern. But I rejected the conclusion that the
defendants would draw from that proposition. To me, it seemed
much too simplistic and failed to take account of the special
17
characteristics of computer code and this new medium.
Although computer code is expressive, it does more than express
the programmers’ concepts. It does more, in other words, than
convey a message. A computer program is a series of instructions that
causes a computer to perform a particular sequence of tasks. Thus, it
has a functional aspect in addition to reflecting the thoughts of the
programmers. A decryption program enables one to circumvent an
access control measure protecting a digital version of a copyrighted
work and thus to infringe the copyright.
What, then, is the appropriate standard of review of measures
preventing dissemination of decryption software that is usable to
circumvent access control systems for copyrighted works? To me, the
persuasive analogy is to the expressive conduct cases, notably the
18
draft card burning case, United States v. O’Brien. The Supreme Court
there recognized that the burning of a draft card to protest the
Vietnam War was expressive. But it refused to ignore the conduct
element-the act of burning the draft card-which, it concluded, had an
adverse effect on the operation of the Selective Service System. So it
upheld the statute in question on the ground that government had a
right to regulate the conduct, at least on the facts of that case.
O’Brien, in my view, was compelling authority in the DVD case. The
dissemination of the decryption program, with its functional
characteristics, threatened to result in severe adverse consequences
for copyright holders. The expressive character of the code no more
saved its functional aspect from regulation than the expressive
character of burning a draft card saved the act of burning it from
regulation.
There is of course one distinction between O’Brien and the DVD
case. Unlike the situation in O’Brien, there is a difference between
distributing a program that permits one to engage in an illegal act of
infringement or circumvention and that forbidden act. I recognize
also that the First Amendment traditionally requires a very close
nexus between the questioned activity and the harm that is said to
justify its regulation. But that is where the special characteristics of
the Internet come in. The Internet makes a decryption program

17. Universal City Studios, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327-36.
18. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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instantaneously available to both potential fair users and potential
pirates alike. Such instantaneous, widespread, and anonymous
availability make it highly likely that such a program will be used for
illicit purposes. It is likely to make enforcement of the rights of the
owners of the protected copyrighted works virtually impossible and
almost certainly far more difficult than in pre-Internet days. Thus,
this new technology has created distinctive difficulties.
These considerations led me in the DVD case to rule that the
constitutionality of measures restricting the dissemination of
decryption computer code of this sort is governed by the O’Brien
standard and to uphold the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA as
applied. Of course, this by no means is the last word on this issue. It
will be up to the courts of appeals and, ultimately, the Supreme Court
to pass the definitive judgment. But it is worth pausing to consider
the fact that the Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected absolutist
views of the First Amendment where their adoption would have
prevented society from dealing with troublesome traits of new
communications media. One need look no further than the
examples I mentioned earlier, the Red Lion and Pacifica cases, in
which the Court upheld the FCC’s fairness doctrine and its
regulation of indecent but not obscene speech, respectively, despite
the fact that it is most unlikely that either of those regulations ever
could have been applied to a newspaper. So it is not a foregone
conclusion, to say the least, that the Internet is entirely beyond
governmental regulation by virtue of its expressive and informational
characteristics. That is not to say that the First Amendment is
irrelevant to the Internet. It doubtless does circumscribe the nature
and extent of any permissible regulation. But I strongly suspect that
the Internet ultimately will be held to be subject to the rule of law,
including the law of copyright. I venture to say that there is no
absolutist answer to the tension between the law of copyright and
untrammeled expression on the Internet. How, then, is this tension
between copyright and expression to be resolved? Is it a matter for
the courts or does the solution lie elsewhere?
The first step is to recognize the essential nature of the dispute. A
copyright is a legally protected virtual monopoly of the right to
publish particular expressions, and there is every reason to suppose
that copyright holders are rational, profit maximizing actors. Their
interest lies in exacting a toll for every use of a copyrighted work.
The interest of users, including users who wish to disseminate
information over the Internet, is to avoid paying the toll. But a
copyright, unlike a patent, is not a perfect monopoly over the
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protected work. It admits of exceptions, most notably the doctrine of
fair use. So the push and pull we are witnessing in substantial
measure is over the breadth or narrowness of the limitations on the
copyright monopoly.
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution goes far in focusing the
issue. It authorizes Congress to provide for copyright protection for a
purpose, that is, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
19
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Thus,
the extent to which Congress may go in granting copyright
protection involves primarily a utilitarian judgment. The principal
question in each case is whether the benefits of a particular measure
in terms of encouraging creativity by rewarding authors are sufficient
to outweigh any adverse consequences it may have. This is well
illustrated by controversy concerning fair use and the DMCA.
In December 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”), held a diplomatic conference in Geneva that led to the
adoption of two treaties. Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
provides in relevant part that contracting states “shall provide
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by
authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this
Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of
their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or
20
permitted by law.”
The adoption of the WIPO Copyright Treaty spurred continued
Congressional attention to the adaptation of the law of copyright to
the digital age. Lengthy hearings involving a broad range of
interested parties both preceded and succeeded the Copyright
Treaty. A critical focus of Congressional consideration was the
conflict between those who opposed anti-circumvention measures as
inappropriate extensions of copyright and impediments to fair use
and those who supported them as essential to proper protection of
21
copyrighted materials in the digital era. What might be termed the
fair use community argued that technological means of protecting
copyrighted works in digital form throw the baby out with the bath
water. They prevent fair and non-infringing uses of copyrighted

19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
20. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, Art. 11, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17
(1997), available at 1997 WL 447232.
21. There is an excellent account of the legislative history of the statute. David
Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 702-38 (2000).
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works as well as piracy and therefore go too far in restricting
expression. They argued that circumvention of access control
measures and dissemination of circumvention technology should not
be restricted, as they facilitate fair use. The other side of the
argument, of course, is that copyright holders will be unwilling to
make their works available in digital form absent effective protection
against circumvention of their access control measures for fear of
infringement and piracy.
The DMCA was enacted in October 1998 as the culmination of this
22
Congressional process, and it clearly evidences Congressional
attempts to accommodate the conflicting interests. It contains two
principal provisions. The first, Section 1201(a)(1), governs “[t]he act
of circumventing a technological protection measure put in place by
a copyright owner to control access to a copyrighted work.” The
second, Section 1201(a)(2), which is known as the anti-trafficking
provision, “supplements the prohibition against the act of
circumvention in paragraph (a)(1) with prohibitions on creating and
making available certain technologies . . . developed or advertised to
defeat technological protections against unauthorized access to a
23
work.”
The anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions, if they
stood alone, probably would limit some fair and non-infringing uses
even as they would reduce piracy. To that extent, they would
interfere with proper expressive activities. The position of the fair
use community thus cannot be rejected out of hand. Congress,
however, recognized that fact. It limited both the anti-circumvention
and the anti-trafficking provisions in ways designed to permit
appropriate use of copyrighted materials while at the same time
protecting the legitimate interests of copyright holders.
To begin with, Congress limited the prohibition of the act of
circumvention to the act itself so as not to “apply to subsequent
actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to
24
a copy of a [copyrighted] work . . . .” By doing so, it left “the
traditional defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, . . .
25
fully applicable” provided “the access is authorized.”
Second, the statute contains a number of exceptions from the anticircumvention provision, the anti-trafficking provision or both.
These include exceptions for reverse engineering, encryption

22.
23.
24.
25.

See generally S. REP. NO. 105-190, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-8 (1998).
Id. at 18.
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(I), 105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 18 (1998).
Id.
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research, security testing and, for libraries, archives and educational
institutions, an exception from the anti-circumvention provision for
the purpose of determining whether to purchase a copy of a
copyrighted work.
Finally, the anti-circumvention provision did not become effective
for a two-year period in order to permit the Library of Congress to
26
exempt classes of works from its scope. The Library of Congress was
charged with conducting a rule making during the two-year period to
determine whether users of copyrighted works of particular classes
were, or were likely to be, affected adversely by the anticircumvention provision in their ability to make non-infringing use of
classes of works, in which case it was empowered to exempt those
classes from the anti-circumvention prohibition. In doing so, it was
instructed to consider, among other factors, the impact of the anticircumvention prohibition on criticism, scholarship, comment, news
reporting, teaching and research, as well as the effect of
circumvention of access control measures on the market for or value
27
of copyrighted works.
The point here is not whether Congress struck the balance in
exactly the right place. Rather, I offer this history to illustrate a point
about process. The text of the statute and its legislative history
confirm quite clearly the essential nature of the issue that is at the
heart of the copyright- Internet controversies. It is the same sort of
largely economic push and pull that is found throughout the broad
scope of our economy and what others have termed the regulatory
state. Will a given air quality standard provide sufficient health
benefits to overcome any adverse economic consequences? Is added
safety testing for a promising new drug worth the potential costs in
delaying the availability of the drug to patients who might benefit
from it? Will airline deregulation cause competitively pressed carriers
to skimp on safety measures, thus outweighing the benefits of cheap
fares? Will the benefits of prohibiting circumvention of access
control measures protecting copyrighted works available on digital
media-benefits in terms of promoting distribution of those works in
digital form-outweigh the harm caused by preventing certain fair
uses?
This sort of judgment in our society traditionally is made in the
legislative arena. It is Congress that is in a position to hear from all
relevant constituencies and to attempt to strike an appropriate

26. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) through (B).
27. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
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balance. It is Congress that is directly responsible to the people. It is
Congress, the Supreme Court wrote in the Betamax case, that it is
entitled to “consistent deference . . . when major technological
developments alter the market for copyrighted material” because
“Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability
to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests
28
that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.” In other
words, within broad limits, Congress is entitled to experiment and
even to make mistakes because it is best suited to dealing with this
problem.
Courts, on the other hand, are not well equipped to make
judgments of this sort. Courts are limited to deciding particular
controversies between usually private parties on the basis of the
evidence that those parties choose to place before them. They have
little ability to ensure development of a full and fair record for the
resolution of broad issues of public policy such as these. They have
no special expertise in making these judgments. They lack any
objective standards by which to make them.
To be sure, there are limits beyond which Congress may not go.
The First Amendment does and, I believe, will continue to stand as a
restraint on repressive regulation under a standard or standards of
review that balance our core value of free expression with the societal
interests, including those served by copyright, that may be threatened
by new technologies. But in the last analysis, the principal forum in
which all or most of the appropriate accommodations must be
reached is Congress.
This will be not be a tidy process. As Otto von Bismarck, once
Chancellor of Prussia, said, “To retain respect for sausages and laws,
one must not watch them in the making.” But it is the very give and
take, the opportunity and indeed necessity for making the messy
compromises, that makes the legislature the appropriate arena.
While the courts can and will serve as referees, they cannot play the
game. At the same time, they can and will enforce the laws that
Congress passes. Those who are under the impression that the
Internet is the new wild, wild West and that there is no law west of the
Pecos have gotten quite a few shocks this year and they are bound to
get more absent acquiescence in the rule of law.
MS. TABER: I would like to express our sincere thanks to Judge
Kaplan for joining us today and for sharing his judicial perspective on
the future of copyright on the Internet. Please join me in thanking

28. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984).
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him again.
At this point, we’ll be taking a half-hour break. We’ll reconvene at
2:00 o’clock for panel three. Panel three will address the future of
copyright on the Internet, new business models and technology
options. We’ll see you then.
(WHEREUPON A RECESS WAS TAKEN).
*****

